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We study the measurement device independent quantum key distribution (MDIQKD) in practice
with limited resource, when there are only 3 different states in implementing the decoy-state method
and when there are basis dependent coding errors. We present general formulas for the decoy-state
method for two-pulse sources with 3 different states, which can be applied to the recently proposed
MDIQKD with imperfect single-photon source such as the coherent states or the heralded states
from the parametric down conversion. We point out that the existing result for secure MDIQKD
with source coding errors does not always hold. We find that very accurate source coding is not
necessary. In particular, we loosen the precision of existing result by several magnitude orders.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.81.Gs, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Security for real set-ups of quantum key distribution(QKD)[1, 2] has become a major problem in the area in the
recent years. The major problems here include the imperfection of source and the limited efficiency of the detection
device. The decoy state method[3–12] can help to make a set-up with an imperfect single photon source be as secure
as that with a perfect single photon source[13, 14].
Besides the source imperfection, the limited detection is another threaten to the security[15]. Theories of the device
independent security proof[16] have been proposed to overcome the problem. However, these theories cannot apply
to the existing real set-ups because violation of Bell’s inequality cannot be strictly demonstrated by existing set-ups.
Very recently, an idea of measurement device independent QKD (MDIQKD) was proposed based on the idea of
entanglement swapping[17, 18]. There, one can make secure QKD simply by virtual entanglement swapping, i.e., Both
Alice and Bob sends BB84 states to the relay which can be controlled by un-trusted third party (UTB). After the UTB
announced his measurement outcome, Alice and Bob will post select those bits corresponding to a successful event
and prepared in the same basis for further processing. In the realization, Alice and Bob can really use entanglement
pairs[17] and measure halves of the pair inside the lab before sending another halves to the UTB. In this way, the
decoy-state method is not necessary even though imperfect entangled pairs (such as the states generated by the type
II parametric down conversion) are used. Even though there are multi-pair events with small probability, these events
do not affect the security. Alice and Bob only need to check the error rates of their post selected bits. However, in our
existing technologies, high quality entangled-pair-state generation can not be done efficiently. In the most matured
technology, the generation rate is lower than 1 from 1000 pump pulses. If we want to obtain a higher key rate, we
can choose to directly use an imperfect single-photon source such as the coherent state[18]. If we choose this, we
must be careful for two issues. First, we must implement the decoy-state method for security. Although this has
been discussed in Ref.[18], calculation formulas for the practical decoy-state implementation with only a few different
states are not given. Second, in this way, the states for coding are prepared actively. If we cannot guarantee to make
exactly the BB84 states, we must take special caution for the security. Although there are already some results for
this[19], there are some drawbacks in practical application of the existing result[19]. First, it requests a very accurate
source coding, e.g., a magnitude order of 10−7 for the state errors for MDIQKD over a distance longer than 100
kms. Second, the existing conclusion seem to be not always correct. The existing theory[19] shows that the source
coding error affects the key rate only through the fidelity between the density matrices of two bases. According to
its conclusion, if the density operators of states in the two bases are identical, then one can calculate the key rate
as if an ideal realization of MDIQKD were done. In such a case, the key rate is determined solely by the detected
error rate. Consider such a special case: in the protocol, Alice and Bob can produce the perfect BB84 states in Z
basis, |0z〉 and |1z〉, but they make big errors in preparing states in X basis. They actually prepared |0z〉 or |1z〉
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2whenever they want to prepare states |0x〉 or |1x〉. Given this fact, Eve. or the UTB can simply measure each pulses
in Z basis without causing any additional noise. Therefore, correct theory should give 0 key rate for this. However,
the existing theory can result in considerable key rate for this case because in principle one can obtain lots of post
selected successful events with small error rate in MDIQKD[20]. Such a problem also exists in the MDIQKD protocol
with entangled-pair states[17]. Although the states out of the labs are identical for whatever basis, the measurement
basis alignment error in detecting the halves of the pair states inside each labs can undermine the security. In an
extreme example, they make measurement in Z basis perfectly. But when they want to use X basis, they actually
used Z basis. Normally, users are not likely to make such big mistakes, however, the existing theory seemed to even
allow these mistakes.
Here in this work, we shall first present formulas of 3-state decoy-state method for the MDIQKD. We then study the
problem source coding error. Our result presented here does not request very accurate source coding as the existing
ones which requests a magnitude order of 10−7 for the state errors, while our request for the accuracy is more loosen
than this by several magnitude orders. Based on the idea of constructing virtual BB84 sources, our result is strict for
security.
II. DECOY-STATE METHOD WITH ONLY 3 STATES FOR MDIQKD
In the protocol, each time a pulse-pair (two-pulse state) is sent to the relay for detection. The relay is controlled
by an un-trusted thirty party (UTP). The UTP will announce whether the pulse-pair has caused a successful event.
Those bits corresponding to successful events will be post-selected and further processed for the final key. Since real
set-ups only use imperfect single-photon sources, we need the decoy-state method for security.
We assume Alice (Bob) has three sources, oA, xA, yA (oB , xB, yB) which can only emit three different states ρoA =
|0〉〈0|, ρxA , ρyA (ρoB = |0〉〈0|, ρxB , ρyB ), respectively, in photon number space. Suppose
ρxA =
∑
k
ak|k〉〈k|; ρyA =
∑
k
a′k|k〉〈k|, ρxB =
∑
k
bk|k〉〈k|; ρyB =
∑
k
b′k|k〉〈k|, (1)
and we request the states satisfy the following very important condition:
a′k
ak
≥
a′2
a2
≥
a′1
a1
;
b′k
bk
≥
b′2
b2
≥
b′1
b1
(2)
for k ≥ 2. The imperfect sources used in practice such as the coherent state source, the heralded source out of the
parametric-down conversion, satisfy the above restriction. Given a specific type of source, the above listed different
states have different averaged photon numbers (intensities), therefore the states can be obtained by controlling the
light intensities. At each time, Alice will randomly select one of her 3 sources to emit a pulse, and so does Bob. The
pulse form Alice and the pulse from Bob form a pulse pair and are sent to the un-trusted relay. We regard equivalently
that each time a two-pulse source is selected and a pulse pair (one pulse from Alice, one pulse from Bob) is emitted.
There are many different two-pulse sources used in the protocol. We denote αβ for the two pulse source when the
pulse-pair is produced by source α at Alice’s side and source β at Bob’s side, α can be one of {oA, xA, yA} and β can
be one of {oB, xB, yB}. For example, at a certain time j Alice uses source oA and Bob uses source yB, we say the
pulse pair is emitted by source oAyB.
In the protocol, two different bases, Z basis consisting of horizontal polarization |H〉〈H | and vertical polarization
|V 〉〈V |, and X basis consisting of pi/4 and 3pi/4 polarizations are used. The density operator in photon number space
alone does not describe the state in the composite space. We shall apply the the decoy-state method analysis in the
same basis (e.g., Z basis or X basis) for pulses from sources xA, xB , yA, yB. Therefore we only need consider the
density operators in the photon number space. For simplicity, we consider pulses from source prepared in Z basis
first.
According to the decoy-state theory, the yield of a certain set of pulse pairs is defined as source αβ is defined
as the happening rate of a successful event (announced by the UTP) corresponding to pulse pairs out of the set.
Mathematically, the yield is n/N where n is the number of successful events happened corresponding to pulse pairs
from the set and N is the number of pulse pairs in the set. Obviously, if we regard the pulse pairs of two-pulse
source αβ as a set, the yield Sαβ for source αβ is Sαβ =
nαβ
Nαβ
, where nαβ is the number of successful events happened
corresponding to pulse pairs from source αβ and Nαβ is the number of times source αβ are used. In the protocol,
there are 9 different two-pulse sources. The yields of these 9 sources can be directly calculated from the observed
experimental data nαβ and Nαβ . We use capital letter Sαβ for these known values.
We can regard any source as a composite source that consists of many (virtual) sub-sources, if the source state
can be be written in a convex form of different density operators. For example, two-pulse source yAyB includes a
3sub-source of pulse pairs of state ρ1 ⊗ ρ1 (ρ1 = |1〉〈1|) with weight a
′
1b
′
1. This is to say, after we have used source
yAyB for N times, we have actually used sub-source of state ρ1 ⊗ ρ1 for a
′
1b
′
1N times, asymptotically. Similarly, the
source xAxB also includes a sub-source of state {ρ1 ⊗ ρ1} with weight a1b1. These two sub-sources of state ρ1 ⊗ ρ1
must have the same yield s11 because they have the same two-pulse state and the pulse pairs are randomly mixed.
Most generally, denote s, s′ as the yields of two sets of pulses, if pulse pairs of these two sets are randomly mixed and
all pulses have the same density operator, then
s = s′ (3)
asymptotically. This is the elementary assumption of the decoy-state theory.
In the protocol, since each sources are randomly chosen, pulses from each sub-sources or sources are also randomly
mixed. Therefore, the yield of a sub-source or a source is dependent on the state only, it is independent of which
physical source the pulses are from. Therefore, we can also define the yield of a certain state: whenever a pulse pair
of that state is emitted, the probability that a successful event happens. Denote
Ωαβ = ρα ⊗ ρβ (4)
for a two-pulse state. The yield of such a state is also the yield of any source which produces state Ωαβ only, or the
yield of a sub-source from any source, provided that the state of the pulse pairs of the sub-source is Ωαβ . Note that,
we don’t always know the value of yield of a state. Because we don’t know which sub-source was used at which time.
We shall use the lower case symbol sα,β to denote the yield of state Ωα,β. In general, the yields of a sub-source (a
state), such as s11 is not directly known from the experimental data. But some of them can be deduced from the
yields of different real sources. Define ρ0 = |0〉〈0|. According to Eq.(3), if α ∈ {0, xA, yA} and β ∈ {0, xB, yB}, we
have
sαβ = Sα˜β˜ (5)
with the mapping of α˜ = (oA, xA, yA) for α = (0, xA, yA), respectively; and β˜ = (oB , xB, yB) for β = (0, xB, yB),
respectively. To understand the meaning of the equation above, we take an example for pulses from source yAyB.
By writing the state of this source in the convex form we immediately know that it includes a sub-source of state
ρ0 ⊗ ρyB . By observing the results caused by source yAyB itself we have no way to know the yield of this sub-source
because we don’t know exactly which time source yA emits a vacuum pulse when we use it. However, the state of this
sub-source is the same with the state of the real source oAyB, therefore the yield of any sub-source of state ρ0 ⊗ ρyB
must be just the yield of the real source oAyB, which can be directly observed in the experiment. Mathematically,
this is s0yB = SoAyB , where the right hand side is the known value of yield of real source oAyB, the left hand side is
the yield of a virtual sub-source from real source yByB.
Our first major task is to deduce s11 from the known values, i.e., to formulate s11, the yield of state |1〉〈1| ⊗ |1〉〈1|
in capital-letter symbols {Sαβ}. We shall use the following convex proposition to do the calculation.
Denote S to be the yield of a certain source of state Ω. If Ω has the convex forms of Ω =
∑
αβ cαβΩαβ, we have
S =
∑
α,β
cαβsαβ . (6)
This equation is simply the fact that the total number of successful events caused by pulses from a certain set is equal
to the summation of the numbers of successful events caused by pulses from each sub-sets.
Consider the convex forms of source xAxB and source yAyB. Explicitly,
ΩxAxB = c˜0Ω˜0 + a1b1ρ1 ⊗ ρ1 + a1cBρ1 ⊗ ρcB + b1cAρcA ⊗ ρ1 + cAcBρcA ⊗ ρcB (7)
where c˜0Ω˜0 = (a0Ω0,x + b0Ωx,0 − a0b0Ω0,0), cAρcA =
(∑
k≥2 ak|k〉〈k|
)
and cBρcB =
(∑
k≥2 bk|k〉〈k|
)
. According to
Eq.(6), this leads to
SxAxB = S˜0 + a1b1s11 + a1cBs1cB + b1cAscA1 + cAcBscAcB (8)
and
S˜0 = a0SoAxB + b0SxAoB − a0b0SoAoB . (9)
We also have
ΩyAyB = c˜
′
0Ω˜
′
0 + a
′
1b
′
1ρ1 ⊗ ρ1 + a
′
1c
′
Bρ1 ⊗ ρc′B + b
′
1c
′
Aρc′A ⊗ ρ1 + c
′
Ac
′
Bρc′A ⊗ ρc′B (10)
4where c˜′0Ω˜
′
0 = (a
′
0Ω0,yB + b
′
0ΩyA,0 − a
′
0b
′
0Ω0,0), c
′
Aρc′A =
(∑
k≥2 a
′
k|k〉〈k|
)
and c′Bρc′B =
(∑
k≥2 bk|k〉〈k|
)
. According
to these, there exists dA ≥ 0 and dB ≥ 0 and normalized density operators ρdA and ρdB so that
c′Aρc′A =
a′2
a2
cAρcA + dAρdA ; c
′
Bρc′B =
b′2
b2
cBρcB + dBρdB . (11)
Here we have used the condition of Eq.(2). According to the definitions of cAρcA and c
′
Aρc′A , we have
dAρdA = c
′
Aρc′A −
a′2
a2
cAρcA =
∑
k≥2
(
a′k −
a′2
a2
ak
)
|k〉〈k| (12)
Using condition of Eq.(2), we find a′k −
a′
2
a2
ak = ak
(
a′k
ak
−
a′
2
a2
)
≥ 0 for all k ≥ 2. This proves the first part of Eq.(11).
In a similar we can also prove the second part of Eq.(11). Therefore we have
ΩyAyB = c˜
′
0Ω˜
′
0 + a
′
1b
′
1ρ1 ⊗ ρ1
+a′1ρ1 ⊗
(
b′2
b2
cBρcB + dBρdB
)
+ b′1
(
a′2
a2
cAρcA + dAρdA
)
⊗ ρ1
+
(
a′2
a2
cAρcA + dAρdA
)
⊗
(
b′2
b2
cBρcB + dBρdB
)
(13)
which means that
SyAyB = S˜
′
0 + a
′
1b
′
1s11 +
b′2
b2
a′1cBs1cB +
a′2
a2
b′1cAscA1 +
b′2a
′
2
b2a2
cAcBscAcB + ξ (14)
where
S˜′0 = a
′
0SoAyB + b
′
0SyAoB − a
′
0b
′
0SoAoB (15)
and ξ = a′1dbs1dB + b
′
1sdA1 + c
′
Asc′AdB + c
′
BsdAc′B ≥ 0. For any sources used in the protocol, we must have either
Ka =
a′
1
b′
2
a1b2
≤
a′
2
b′
1
a2b1
= Kb or Ka ≥ Kb. Suppose the former one holds. Calculating Eq.(8)×Ka−Eq.(14), we obtain
s11 =
Ka(SxAxB − S˜0)− (SyAyB − S˜
′
0) + ζ1 + ζ2 + ξ
Kaa1b1 − a′1b
′
1
where S˜0 and S˜
′
0 are defined by Eq.(9) and Eq.(15), respectively and ζ1 =
(
a′
2
a2
b′1 −Kab1
)
cAscA1 =
(Kb −Ka) b1cAscA1 ≥ 0, ζ2 =
(
a′
2
b′
2
a2b2
−Ka
)
cAcBscAcB =
(
a1
a′
1
a′
2
a2
− 1
)
KacAcBscAcB ≥ 0. Note that
a1
a′
1
a′
2
a2
≥ 1 ac-
cording to Eq.(2). As shown already, ξ ≥ 0. Thus we have
s11 ≥
a′1b
′
2(SxAxB − S˜0)− a1b2(SyAyB − S˜
′
0)
a′1a1(b
′
2b1 − b2b
′
1)
(16)
where S˜0 and S˜
′
0 are defined by Eq.(9) and Eq.(15), respectively. If Ka ≥ Kb holds, through calculating
Eq.(8)×Kb−Eq.(14), we obtain
s11 ≥
a′2b
′
1(SxAxB − S˜0)− a2b1(SyAyB − S˜
′
0)
b′1b1(a
′
2a1 − a
′
1a2)
.
This and Eq.(16) are our major formula for the decoy-state method implementation for MDIQKD. Note that, this
formula always holds for whatever source that satisfies the condition in Eq.(2). Physical sources such as the coherent
light, the heralded source by the parametric down conversion all meet the condition. We thus arrive at the major
conclusion of this section.
5In the protocol, there are two different basis. We denote sZ11 and s
X
11 for yields of single-photon pulse pairs in Z
basis and X basis, respectively. Consider those post-selected bits caused by source yAyB in Z basis. After error test,
we know the bit-flip error rate of this set, say EZyByB . We also need the phase-flip rate for the sub-set of bits which
are caused by the two-single-photon pulses, say Eph11 , which is equal to the flip rate of post selected bits caused by
single-photon in X basis, say EX11. We have
EX11 ≤
EXxAxBS
X
xAxB
− a0E
X
oAxB
SXoAxB − b0E
X
xAoB
SXxAoB + a0b0E
X
oAoB
SXoAoB
a1b1sX11
(17)
Here EXαβ is the error rate for those post selected bits in X basis, caused by pulses from source αβ; S
X
αβ is the yield
of source αβ in X basis. If ρxA = ρxB and ρyA = ρyB , we simply replace all b0, b1 above by a0, a1. Given this, we
can now calculate the key rate by the well known formula. For example, for those post selected bits caused by source
yAyB, it is
R = a′1b
′
1s
Z
11(1−H(E
X
11)) − fSyAyBH(E
Z
yByB
) (18)
where f is the efficiency factor of the error correction method used.
Now we discuss the value of sX11 as used in Eq.(17). If we implement the decoy-state method for different bases
separately, we can calculate sZ11 and s
X
11 separately and s
X
11 is known.
We can also choose to implement the decoy-state method only in Z basis. This is to say, in X basis, we don’t have
state ρyAyB , we only have state ρxAxB . All pulses of state ρyByB will be only prepared in Z basis. The advantage of
this is to reduce the basis mismatch so as to raise the key rate. The value of s11 for X−basis pulses can be deduced
from that for Z−basis. Suppose at each side, horizontal polarization and vertical polarization have equal probability
to be chosen. For all those single-photon pairs in Z basis, the state in polarization space is
1
4
(
ΩHH11 +Ω
V V
11 +Ω
HV
11 +Ω
VH
11
)
=
1
4
I (19)
where ΩPQ11 = |P 〉〈P | ⊗ |Q〉〈Q|, P,Q indicate the polarization which can be either H or V . On the other hand, for
all those two-single-photon pulse pairs prepared in X basis, if the pi/4 and 3pi/4 polarizations are chosen with equal
probability, one can easily find that the density matrix for these single-photon pairs is also I/4. Therefore we conclude
sZ11 = s
X
11. (20)
III. SECURITY WITH BASIS-DEPENDENT CODING ERRORS
In practice, there are many imperfections for the real set-ups. For example, that Eqs.(3,5) only hold asymptotically.
The number of pulses is finite hence these equations do not hold exactly due to the statistical fluctuation. Say, s and
s′, sα,β and S,˜β˜ can be a bit different. Denote sαβ and s
′
αβ for the yields of pulses of states ρα⊗ ρβ from two different
sources. In general we have
sαβ = s
′
αβ(1 + δαβ) (21)
where δαβ is the statistical fluctuation whose value is among a certain range with a probability exponentially close
to 1. The range can be calculated given the number of pulses of each sub-sources. We can then seek the worst-case
result among the range of δαβ. Another imperfection is the intensity fluctuations. This can also be solved by the way
given in[10].
Here we consider the state-dependent coding errors, as studied in[19].
For clarity, we first consider the normal QKD protocol where Alice sends pulses and Bob receives and detects them.
The main idea is the to decompose a density operator into convex form and the concept of virtual sub-sources. The
result is enhanced by combining additional real operation of imperfect phase randomizing.
A. Density operator decomposition, virtual sub-sources, and basis-dependent error for the normal QKD
protocol.
For simplicity, we assume a perfect single-photon source with basis-dependent coding errors. Say, at a certain time
j, Alice wants to prepare state |0jW 〉 or |1jW 〉 in basis W (W can be Z or X) according to her bit value 0 or 1, she
6actually prepares |0actjW 〉 = cos θ0jW |0jW 〉+ sin θ0jW e
iδ0jW |1jW 〉 or |1
act
jW 〉 = cos θ1jW |1jW 〉+ sin θ1jW e
iδ1jW |0jW 〉. We
name this subscribed θ as error angle. At different times of j, the subscribed values of parameters θ and δ can be
different and can be correlated at different times. We set the threshold angles θZ and θX as
Max{|θ0jZ |, |θ1jZ |} ≤ θZ , Max{|θ0jX |, |θ1jX |} ≤ θX (22)
of course all {|θ0jW |, | sin θ1jW |} must be rather small, otherwise no secure final key can be generated. Actually, as
shall be shown latter, our theory also apply to the case that most of these θ angles are very small but occasionally the
values can be large. In such a case, we only need to reset the threshold angles as larger than most of {|θ0jW |, |θ1jW |}
so that the threshold values can be still rather small. For this moment we use Eq.(22). Also, we omit the subscript
j if it does not cause any confusion. Our main idea is to modify the protocol by randomly producing a wrong state
with a certain small probability. In this way, each single-photon state can be decomposed into a classical probabilistic
mixture of two states, with one of them being ideal BB84 states. Therefore, there exists a virtual BB84 sub-source in
the protocol, and states generated by that sub-source are perfect BB84 states. By decomposing the density operator
of the BB84 source, I/2, one finds that the yield of such a source is at least half of any other source. Therefore, the
lower bound of fraction of bits caused by the ideal BB84 source can be calculated with whatever channel loss. With
this, the phase flip error rate of the BB84 sub-source can also be calculated and hence one can obtain the final key
rate.
1. Modified protocol and virtual ideal BB84 sub-sources
We consider the modified protocol as the following:
According to her prepared bit value (b = 0 or 1) in W basis, in stead of preparing state |0actW 〉 (or |1
act
W 〉), she takes a
probability 1− pw to prepare a state |0
act
W 〉 and a small probability pw to intentionally prepare a wrong state |1
act
W 〉.
Therefore, the density matrix of a pulse corresponding to bit values 0 or 1 in Z basis is
ρZ0 = (1− pz)|0
act
Z 〉〈0
act
Z |+ pz|1
act
Z 〉〈1
act
Z | (23)
or
ρZ1 = (1− pz)|1
act
Z 〉〈1
act
Z |+ pz|0
act
Z 〉〈0
act
Z |, (24)
respectively. It is easy to show that, by choosing an appropriate value pz, there exists positive value ∆z so that the
density matrices of ρZ0 and ρ
Z
1 can be written in the convex forms of
ρZ0 = ∆z |0Z〉〈0Z |+ (1−∆z)ρz0,res. (25)
and
ρZ1 = ∆z |1Z〉〈1Z |+ (1−∆z)ρz1,res. (26)
Here, ∆z can be rather close to 1 if θz is small. For example, by setting pz = | tan θz|, we can take
∆z = cos
2 θz(1− 2 tan θz) (27)
for the above convex forms. Similarly, we find those states for bits 0 or 1 in X basis can also be decomposed to convex
forms of
ρX0 = ∆x|0X〉〈0X |+ (1−∆x)ρx0,res, ρ
X
1 = ∆x|1X〉〈1X |+ (1−∆x)ρx1,res (28)
and we can take
∆x = cos
2 θx(1− 2 tan θx) (29)
by setting
px = tan θx. (30)
For a pulse sent at any time by Alice, the state can be one of {ρZ0 , ρ
Z
1 , ρ
X
0 , ρ
X
1 }, depends on the bit value and the basis
she has chosen for that pulse. However, given the convex forms above, we can now assume different virtual sources.
For state ρZ0 , we assume two virtual sources, source z˜0 which produces state |0Z〉〈0Z | only; source z
′
0 which produces
7state ρz0,res only. Say, whenever Alice decides to send out ρ
Z
0 , we assume she uses source z˜0 with probability ∆z or
uses source z′0 with probability 1 −∆z . Similarly, we have virtual source z˜1 which only produces state |1Z〉〈1Z | and
virtual source z′1 which only produces state ρz1,res. When Alice decides to send a state corresponding bit 1 in Z basis,
we can equivalently assume that she uses source z˜1 or source z
′
1 with probabilities of ∆z and 1 − ∆z. In the same
idea, we also assume virtual sub-sources x˜b, x
′
b which only produces state |bX〉〈bX | or ρxb,res, with probabilities of ∆x
and 1−∆x, and b = 0, 1. If we only use those bits caused by pulses from virtual sub-sources z˜b, x˜b, it is just an ideal
QKD protocol without any coding error and hence the standard results apply directly. We call these virtual sub-sources
ideal sub-sources because they produce ideal states as requested by standard BB84 protocol. Also, we name virtual
sub-sources w′b as tagged sub-source since we assume the worst case that Eve can know bit values corresponding to a
pulse from any tagged sub-source. (Here w can be x or y and b can be 0 or 1).
2. Fraction of bits from ideal BB84 source and final key rate
Since these sub-sources are virtual, we don’t know which pulses are from them. Given a lossy channel, we need
to estimate faithfully how many bits are generated by the ideal sub-source the phase-flip rate for bits from the ideal
sources. Define virtual source w˜ = w˜0 + w˜1, where w can be either z or x. These mean that virtual source z˜ (or x˜)
includes all pulses from ideal BB84 sub-sources in Z (or X) basis. Obviously, density operator of a pulses from such
an ideal source is simply ρ˜w = I/2 . We also regard the two tagged sub-sources subscribed by 0 or 1 as one composite
tagged source w′, say w′ = w′0 +w
′
1. The density operator of a pulse from such a source in W basis at a certain time
j is ρ′w(j) =
ρw0,res+ρw1,res
2 . For example, in X basis, the density operator of a pulse from such a source (source x
′ )
at time j is ρ′x(j) =
ρx0,res+ρx1,res
2 . The state of a pulse in X basis at time j is
ρX(j) = ∆xI/2 + (1−∆x)ρ
′
x(j). (31)
Here ∆x is independent of time j, though ρ
′
x is dependent on time j. This means, whenever there is a pulse in X
basis sent out, it has a probability ∆x that the ideal source w˜ is used, a probability 1 −∆x that the tagged source
x′ is used. To estimate the upper bound of error rate of post selected bits caused by pulses from source x˜, we need
the lower bound of fraction of bits caused by virtual source x˜ among all post-selected bits in basis X . Note that
the density matrix for source x˜ is simply I/2, there always exists a density operator ρ¯ so that source x˜ can have the
convex form of
I/2 =
1
2
(ρ¯(j) + ρ′x(j)). (32)
Here ρ¯(j) is defined as ρ¯(j) =
(
c −d
−b a
)
if ρ′x(j) =
(
a d
b c
)
. This means that we can regard source x˜ as a mixed
source consisting of two parts: source ˜¯x that can only emit ρ¯(j) at time j and source x˜′ that can only emit ρ′x(j) at
time j. Whenever a pulse is sent out of source x˜, with half a probability that source x˜′ is used, which generates the
same state (ρ′x(j)) as the tagged source x
′ does, at any time j. Asymptotically, if the total number of X-basis pulses
sent out is Nx, there are N˜x = Nx∆x from ideal source x˜ and Nx(1 −∆x) from tagged source x
′. Denote s˜x, ˜¯sx, s˜
′
x,
and s′x as the yield of sources x˜, ˜¯x, x˜
′ and x′, respectively. We have
s˜x =
1
2
˜¯sx +
1
2
s˜′x ≥
1
2
s′x. (33)
Here we have used the following two facts: (1) The yield of any source must be non-negative, therefore ˜¯sx ≥ 0; (2)
Source x˜′ and source x′ can only produce the same state (ρ′x(j)) at any time j, they must have the same yield in the
whole protocol. Therefore, among all bits caused by source X , the fraction of bits caused by ideal source x˜ is
∆˜x =
Nx∆xs˜x
Nx∆xs˜x +Nx(1−∆x)s′x
≥
∆x/2
1−∆x/2
= ∆˜lx. (34)
In Z basis, there is also a similar formula. Asymptotically, among all those post selected bits of basis W , the
fraction of bits caused by source w˜ is
∆˜w ≥
∆w
2−∆w
=
cos2 θw(1 − 2 tan θw)
sin2 θw + (sin θw + cos θw)
2 . (35)
8Suppose the error rate for all X-basis bits is EX . Then the error rate for bits caused by pulses from source x˜ and the
phase flip rate of Z-basis bits caused by pulses from source z˜ is
EZz,ph = E
X
x =
EX
∆˜x
. (36)
We have assumed a perfect single-photon source in the above. If we use an imperfect single-photon source, we need
implement the decoy state method. We have the key rate formula
R = ∆˜z∆1(1−H(
EX
∆˜x∆1
)) − fH(E) (37)
and ∆˜x, ∆˜z are given by Eqs.(35), E is the detected error rate of Z-basis bits and ∆1 is the fraction of single-photon
pulses bits in Z basis as post selected.
In the protocol, we request Alice take random flip of her qubits with a small probability. However, these flipping
operations are actually not necessary physically. In stead of flipping he qubits physically, she can choose to randomly
choosing to flip her classical bit values with the same small probability. Same with the case of flipping her qubits
physically, this will cause a rise in the error rate. The rise of the bit flip part does not decrease the final key rate
because Alice knows which bits have been flipped. The rise of the phase flip part is the major factor that causes the
final key dropping. Besides this, there are also factors such as ∆˜z in the key rate formula and 1/∆˜x in estimating the
phase error. These also decrease the key rate, but the amount decreased is almost negligible compared with the factor
of phase flip rise. However, all these does not requests a very accurate source coding. Obviously, one can obtain final
key given the largest source error (i.e., sin2 θz )in the magnitude order of 10
−4. This has already loosened the demand
in the source accuracy, compared with the existing result which requests a magnitude order of 10−7− 10−6. However,
as shall be shown later in our work that we can further loosen the accuracy to 10−2 − 10−1 for the magnitude order
of largest error, by adding phase randomizing operation.
In the study above, we have have set θw ≥ {|θ0jW |, |θ1jW |} for all j, i.e., error angles at all individual times must
by smaller than the threshold angle. We can also treat the case most of |θ0jW |, |θ1jW | not larger than θw but a small
fraction gw of them larger than it. In this case, we only need to reset ∆˜z , ∆˜x in the key rate formula Eq.(37) by:
∆˜w −→
1− gw
1 + gw
∆˜w (38)
B. Enhanced results with phase randomizing
We can add real physical operations to the protocol in order to further increase the efficiency. In stead of random
flipping to bit values, we can choose to take a phase randomizing operation to decompose the states into convex
form. Suppose we use the photon polarization space. To each qubits in Z basis, with half a probability we take an
additional unitary operation of (|H〉 −→ |H〉, |V 〉 −→ −|V 〉); to each qubit in X basis, with half a probability we
take an additional unitary operation of (|+〉 −→ |+〉, |−〉 −→ −|−〉). If we can realize such an operation perfectly, we
can obtain convex forms for density operators corresponding to each bit values in each bases and we can directly use
the ideal of virtual sub-sources to solve the problem. For example, for those pulses corresponding to bit values 0 and
1in Z basis, we have
ρZ0 = cos
2 θz0|0Z〉〈0Z |+ sin
2 θz0|1Z〉〈1Z | = cos
2 θz|0Z〉〈0Z |+ sin
2 θzρz0,res (39)
and
ρZ1 = cos
2 θz1|1Z〉〈1Z |+ sin
2 θz1|1Z〉〈1Z | = cos
2 θz|1Z〉〈1Z |+ sin
2 θzρz1,res (40)
We can regard that there are sub-sources of z0 which only emits state |0Z〉 and sub-source z1 which only emits state
|1Z〉. Each sub-source will be used with a constant probability cos
2 θz/2. Density operators for those qubits in X
basis can also be decomposed in
ρX0 = cos
2 θx|0x〉〈+|+ sin
2 θxρx0,res (41)
and
ρX1 = cos
2 θx|1Z〉〈1Z |+ sin
2 θxρx1,res (42)
9We can regard that there are sub-sources of x0 which only emits state |0X〉 and sub-source x1 which only emits state
|1x〉. Each sub-source will be used with a constant probability cos
2 θx/2. Therefore pulses from the 4 sub-sources
above form the ideal BB84 states. We can use Eq.(37) for the key rate, but the value EX1 is not over estimate at all,
and factors of ∆˜W = cos
2 θW , which is almost 1 if θW is small. In this way, the tolerable largest coding error is in the
magnitude order of 1/10, if the phase randomization can be realized. What is most interesting is that we can obtain
almost the same good result even though the phase randomization is a little bit imperfect, through applying results
in the earlier subsection.
In an imperfect phase randomization, to each qubit in X basis, with half a probability we take an additional unitary
operation of (|0X〉 −→ |0X〉, |1X〉 −→ |1X〉 − e
−iδ2 |+〉). Here δ2 are errors in the operations, it can be different from
time to time, and can be correlated at different times. We assume the largest values for |δ2| is δx. We can also choose
to do phase randomization for qubts in Z-basis, but this is not necessary since the major factor in efficiency is in
tightness of phase flip rate estimation. Technically, if the phase operation is done in only one basis, the rotation
between the two basis states is negligible. Therefore we can use the above diagonal form above in X-basis for an
imperfect phase operation.By the current matured technology, value δx can be controlled below 1/20. With these, we
obtain the density matrices of qubits in X basis. For a qubit of bit value 0 in X basis,
ρX0 =
(
cos2 θx0 sin 2θx0(2 sin
2 δ1 − i sin δ)/4
sin 2θx0(2 sin
2 δ1 + i sin δ)/4 sin
2 θ
)
(43)
This can be directly decomposed in
ρX0 = ∆x|0X〉〈0X |+ (1−∆x)ρx0,res (44)
and ∆x = cos
2 θx − sin θx sin δx/2. Similarly, we can also decompose the density matrix for bit value 1 in X basis.
Explicitly,
ρX1 = ∆x|1X〉〈1X |+ (1 −∆x)ρx1,res. (45)
Therefore, there exists two virtual ideal sub-sources which emit state |+〉 or state |−〉 only. The fraction of bits caused
by pulses form these two ideal sub-sources among all post-selected X bits is
∆˜x =
∆x
2−∆x
=
2 cos2 θx − sin θx sin δx/
4− 2 cos2 θx + sin θx sin δx
. (46)
We don’t need to take phase operation to qubits in Z basis. We just take random flipping to the bit values of Z basis
with a small probability as discussed in the earlier section. We shall still use the key rate formula of Eq.(37), but the
key rate is greatly improved now, because here the phase flip rate is over estimated only by a negligible amount, i.e.,
a factor of 1/∆˜AX given by Eq.(46).
C. MDIQKD with source coding errors.
Here we need to convert our results to the case of two-pulse sources. In this case, both Alice and Bob will
send their pulses to the un-trusted third party (UTB), as has been shown. Neither Alice nor Bob can prepare
the coding state exactly. When anyone of them wants to prepare a state |bW 〉, she (he) can only prepare a state
|bactW 〉 = cos θbW |bW 〉 + e
iδbW sin θbW |b¯W 〉 and b = 0, 1, b¯W = 1 ⊕ bW . Most generally, Alice and Bob have different
threshold angles, noted as θAz, θAx for Alice in Z or X basis; and θBz, θBx for Bob in Z or X basis.
In our protocol, we request Bob (Alice) to take a probability 1 − pBw (or 1 − pAw) to prepare a state |b
act
W 〉 and
probability pBw (pAw) to prepare |b¯
act
W 〉, if the data of bit value indicates that he (she) should prepare a state |bW 〉,
in basis W (i.e., Z or X). By analysis similar to the subsection above, we can also present the appropriate convex
forms and find the ideal sub-sources for Alice and Bob separately, in both bases. Suppose θAw, θBw are threshold
angles in basis W for Alice and Bob, respectively. We can set pγw = tan θγw (γ = A,B). Then the density operators
at Alice’s side and the one at Bob’s side can be decomposed in convex forms similar to equation (23,24). We have
the decomposition form
ραWb = ∆αw |bW 〉〈bW |+ (1−∆αw)ραbw,res. (47)
for a state corresponding to bit value b in basis at side α = A or B. In our notation, as a subscript of ∆, the lower
case w can be x or z if the basis W takes X or Z. Here ∆αw = cos
2 θαw(1 − 2 tan θαw). Both Alice and Bob have
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virtual ideal sub-sources which emit standard BB84 states. Therefore, a single-photon pair corresponding to bit value
a and b at Alice’s side and Bob’s side in basis W correspond to a two-pulse state
ρAWa ⊗ ρ
BW
b = ∆
(2)
w |a〉〈a| ⊗ |b〉〈b|+ (1 −∆
(2)
w )ρabw,res (48)
and
∆(2)w = ∆Aw∆Bw (49)
where ∆γw is given by Eqs.(27,29) with z or x replaced by γw there. We define virtual two-pulse ideal sub-sources
{Wab}, a, b can be 0 or 1. If at a certain time states of both single-photon pulses are from idea virtual sub-sources
and are corresponding to bit values a, b in basis W , we say the pulse-pair is from source Wab, which is a two-pulse
ideal virtual sub-source. If at a certain time the pulses from two sides are in the same basis W but not from
any of the above virtual ideal sub-sources, we regard them as tagged states from source the tagged source which
produce states ρ′W,res only. Therefore, we can regard all single-photon pairs in Z basis as coming form 5 different
virtual sources: Z00, Z11, Z01, Z10 and Z
′
res, which only emits two-pulse state |0Z0Z〉, |1Z1Z〉, |0Z1Z〉, |1Z0Z〉 and state
ρ′Z,res =
1
4Σa,bρabW,res. We can also regard the first 4 sources as one composite source, Z˜ which emits single-photon
-pair state of density matrix I/2 in 4× 4 space only. We can then regard any single-photon pair in Z basis comes out
from source Z˜ with a probability ∆
(2)
z , or from source Z ′res with a probability 1−∆
(2)
z . We can find that the fraction
of bits caused by source W˜ among all those post selected bits in W basis caused by single-photon pairs as
∆˜w =
∆
(2)
w
2−∆
(2)
w
(50)
Observing the error rate of X−basis pairs from the decoy-source, EXxAxB , we can find the upper bound E
X
11, the error
rate of those post-selected bits corresponding to single-photon pairs in X−basis by Eq.(17), and then upper bound
the error rate of post selected bits corresponding to single-photon pairs in X−basis bits caused by virtual source X˜ is
E11,X˜ ≤ E
X
11/∆˜x (51)
where EX11 is the error rate for post selected bits in X basis caused by single-photon pairs, as given by Eq.(17). This
is also the asymptotic phase-flip rate of bits corresponding to two-single-photon pulses from source Z˜. We can then
use the key rate formula of Eq.(37), with ∆˜x and phase-flip rate given above. Finally, we have the following key rate
formula for decoy-state MDIQKD with basis dependent errors:
R = ∆˜z∆
Z
11(1−H(E11,X˜))− fH(E
Z
11) (52)
and ∆Z11 =
a′
1
b′
1
sZ
11
SyAyB
, a′1, b
′
1 are parameters appeared in the signal states ρyA , ρyB as given by Eq.(1), s
Z
11 is given by
Eq.(16), EZ11 is the observed error rate for all post-selected bits in Z basis, SyAyB is the observed yield of two-pulse
source yAyB as defined in Section 1.
We must change the formula if we only implement decoy-state method in Z basis, in preparing X−basis bits,
we only use source xAxB . We need derive the upper bound of E
ph
11,Z˜
, the phase-flip rate of bits corresponding to
single-photon pairs from source Z˜, which is equal to E11,X˜ . Note that now in general, s
X
11 6= s
Z
11, since the polarization
states for Z basis and X basis are different. But the yields from the ideal sources X˜ and Z˜ must be equal. We have
s11,X˜ = s11,Z˜ ≥ ∆˜
(2)
z s
Z
11 (53)
which immediately leads to
E11,X˜ ≤
EX11
∆˜
(2)
z ∆˜
(2)
x
(54)
and E˜X11, is given by Eq.(17). With this, the key rate can be calculated by Eq.(52).
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Note added Applying our formulas for the 3-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD, numerical calculation was done recently
and a key rate close to the ideal case was obtained for coherent state source[21].
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